投资决策分析方法的缺陷及改进

本文指出了传统投资决策方法的缺陷 ,提出了将期权理论应用于投资决策的总体思路 ,突破了传统决策分析的局限性 ,使决策更加科学和合理     

技术创新与增长期权定价

本采用了净现值(NPV)和实物期权定价方法对一个实际的MMDS的发射放大器项目进行了定价，并对两种方法定价的结果进行了分析和对比。由于实物期权方法定价的结果包含项目中的增长期权和放弃期权的价值，因而实物期权方法定价的结果比NPV方法定价的结果更合理和更高。     

美式期权定价中非局部问题的有限元方法

在本文中 ,我们关心的是美式期权的有限元方法 .首先 ,根据 [4 ]我们对所讨论的问题引进一个新奇的实用的方法 ,它涉及到对原问题重新形成准确的数学公式 ,使得数值解的计算可以在非常小的区域上进行 ,从而该算法计算速度快精度高 .进而 ,我们利用超逼近分析技术得到了有限元解关于 L2 -模的最优估计 .     

提前还贷及其隐含期权的分析

可提前还款的定期贷款是隐含着期权的利率衍生物，本文建立CIR利率模型下可提前还款的定期贷款的数学模型，通过离散偏微分方程，建立了模型的计算方法，讨论了随机利率对提前还贷的影响．     

Optimal stopping problems by two or more decision makers: a survey

A review of the optimal stopping problem with more than a single decision maker (DM) is presented in this paper. We classify the existing literature according to the arrival of the offers, the utility of the DMs, the length of the sequence of offers, the nature of the game and the number of offers to be selected. We enumerate various definitions for this problem and describe some dynamic approaches. Fouad Ben Abdelaziz is on leave from the Institut Superieur de Gestion, University of Tunis, Tunisia e-mail: foued.benabdelaz@isg.run.tn.     

Calibration of a basket option model applied to company valuation

Applying real options thinking to company valuation seems theoretically and intuitively appealing. However, the real option analogy of a single European option as well as the compound option proxy perform poorly when applied to company valuation. We therefore suggest to rework the building blocks of real option applications to corporate valuation.  We introduce a framework to delineate the distribution of the underlying asset in the risk neutral world, which is important in order to value any derivative. This is achieved by an algorithm to calibrate a basket option model using real world data of observed share prices. The fitting takes account of the class of stable distributions. The index of stability of asymmetric α stable distribution serves as an over-all parameter to characterise the specific distribution.     

Reflection of Long Game Formulas

We study game formulas the truth of which is determined by a semantical game of uncountable length. The main theme is the study of principles stating reflection of these formulas in various admissible sets. This investigation leads to two weak forms of strict-II¹₁ reflection (or ∑₁-compactness). We show that admissible sets such as H(ω₂) and L_ω2 which fail to have strict-II¹₁ reflection, may or may not, depending on set-theoretic hypotheses satisfy one or both of these weaker forms. Mathematics Subject Classification : 03C70, 03C75.     

动态随机弹性在期权定价中的应用

给出动态随机弹性的概念及运算性质,讨论了动态随机弹性在期权定价模型中的应用.主要结果有:(1)在波动率为常数时,期权价格对的弹性,得到了动态随机弹性服从运动,并给出了相应的经济解释;(2)由于波动率一般不是常数,也是随机过程,因此本文进一步研究了期权价格对波动率的弹性,就股票价格的波动情况给出了数学描述和金融意义上的解释.     

Location of terror response facilities: A game between state and terrorist

We study a leader follower game with two players: a terrorist and a state where the later one installs facilities that provide support in case of a terrorist attack. While the Terrorist attacks one of the metropolitan areas to maximize his utility, the State, which acts as a leader, installs the facilities such that the metropolitan area attacked is the one that minimizes her disutility (i.e., minimizes ‘loss’). We solve the problem efficiently for one facility and we formulate it as a mathematical programming problem for a general number of facilities. We demonstrate the problem via a case study of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the United States.     

Survivable network design under optimal and heuristic interdiction scenarios

We examine the problem of building or fortifying a network to defend against enemy attacks in various scenarios. In particular, we examine the case in which an enemy can destroy any portion of any arc that a designer constructs on the network, subject to some interdiction budget. This problem takes the form of a three-level, two-player game, in which the designer acts first to construct a network and transmit an initial set of flows through the network. The enemy acts next to destroy a set of constructed arcs in the designer’s network, and the designer acts last to transmit a final set of flows in the network. Most studies of this nature assume that the enemy will act optimally; however, in real-world scenarios one cannot necessarily assume rationality on the part of the enemy. Hence, we prescribe optimal network design algorithms for three different profiles of enemy action: an enemy destroying arcs based on capacities, based on initial flows, or acting optimally to minimize our maximum profits obtained from transmitting flows.